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Cothran: Dischargeability of Consumer Credit Card Debt After Anastas v. Am

DISCHARGEABILITY OF
CONSUMER CREDIT CARD DEBT AFTER
ANASTAS V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK
(IN RE ANASTAS)'
I. INTRODUCTION

Courts have grappled for years with the problem of applying the
bankruptcy discharge provisions of § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code (the Code) to consumer credit card debts. In cases where the debtor
obtained credit under fraudulent circumstances the Code provides an exception
to the normal rule of dischargeability. 2 No definitive precedent exists,
however, to guide bankruptcy courts in determining exactly what circumstances define fraudulently obtained credit. Consequently, the law in this area
consists of conflicting opinions issued by hundreds of individual bankruptcy
court judges? Against this backdrop of confusion, the recent opinion of the
influential Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Anastas v. American Savings
Bank (In re Anastas)f is particularly significant.
To determine whether or not to refuse discharge under § 523, a court
must look at the intent of the debtor. The credit card issuer typically objects
to a discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) by claiming that the debtor did not intend
to repay the debt at the time the charges were incurred. The debtor typically
responds by adamantly denying such a deceptive purpose. Thus, the dispositive
issue comes before the court: did the debtor truly intend to repay at the time
the debt was incurred? Courts have traditionally used an objective test to

1. 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. Section 523 provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained, by(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition ....
11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994). See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
523.01, -.05, -.08 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) for a general background discussion of this statute.
3. As one such judge recently noted, "I.r]he implications of a debtor's use of a credit card
presents [sic] one of those bankruptcy issues on which a court can find a published opinion to
support almost any position one wishes to adopt." American Express Centurion Bank Optima v.
Choi (In re Choi), 203 B.R. 397, 399 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996).
4. 94 F.3d at 1280.
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determine a debtor's intent. This test has focused on the debtor's objectively
measured ability to repay.5
The Anastas court rejected the objective approach in favor of a strict
subjective test. Ruling that the debtor's credit card debts were in fact
dischargeable, the Anastas court held that dischargeability turned on whether
the debtor lacked the intent to repay the debts at the time they were incurred-not whether the debtor lacked the ability to repay." Anastas is the
first decision at the appellate level to establish a clear test for determining a
consumer debtor's intent in a credit card debt dischargeability proceeding, and
again, the test is strictly a subjective one.
Some of the ramifications of Anastas are fairly clear. A strict subjective
test of intent will make it considerably more difficult for credit card issuers to
prove fraud.7 Conversely, a strict subjective test will make it easier for
debtors to overcome objections to discharge and escape their consumer credit
card problems through bankruptcy.
This note examines Anastas and some of its precursors and progeny8 with
an eye towards their policy implications. The examination reveals that, even
after Anastas, the test for debtor intent remains unsettled for two reasons.
First, a truly subjective test of intent in the context of dischargeability of
consumer credit card debt is as elusive as the quest for subjective intent in any
context. Aside from a person's self-serving testimony, the only evidence of
subjective intent is that which is observable through a person's objective
behavior. Second, courts appear to be crafting their decisions, at least partly,
as ad hoc reactions to the recent conduct of many credit card issuers. In
conclusion, this note argues that Congress should remove the common law
element of intent from § 523(a)(2)(A) and statutorily adopt an objective
standard to govern the dischargeability of consumer credit card debt.
II. DISCHARGEABILrTY OF CONSUMER CREDIT CARD DEBT BEFORE AND
AFTER ANASTAS

In Field v. Mans,9 the United States Supreme Court provided that the
term "fraud," as it appears in § 523(a)(2)(A), should be construed in

5. For a representative listing of cases, see Citibankv. Eashai(In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082,
1088 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996).
6. 94 F.3d at 1285.
7. "'Credit card companies are going to go berserk.'" Credit Card Debts Are Easier To
Discharge by Going Bankrupt, LAW. VKLY. USA, Sept. 23, 1996, at I (quoting Professor
Jeffrey Morris of the University of Dayton School of Law); "The ruling is bad news for banks."
Id. (citing Professor Walter Effross of the Washington College of Law at American University).
8. The cases discussed were selected for their representative support or opposition to the
general holding of the Ninth Circuit in Anastas.
9. 116 S. Ct. 437, 443 n.9 (1995).
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accordance with its common law tort meaning."0 The common law tort of
fraud requires that there be (1) a false representation, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity, (3) intending to induce reliance thereon (4) and justifiably
relied upon (5) with resulting damage." Even prior to Field, courts were in
general agreement that a creditor seeking to avoid discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) had to prove all of the elements of common law fraud.'
Notwithstanding this facial clarity, courts have differed widely on what is
required to establish the elements of common law fraud in consumer credit
card debt discharge cases. The most significant differences have concerned
how courts judge a debtor's intent, how they determine the nature of any
representation made by the credit card user, and how they decide whether or
not a card issuer relied on the debtor's representation when extending
3

credit. 1

The differences in the approaches taken by courts persist perhaps because
of the nature of the typical credit card transaction. Unlike most traditional
forms of credit transactions, there is no direct, "face-to-face contact" between
the lender and the debtor. 4 The typical card issuer makes a decision to
provide credit to the debtor by mere approval of a credit card application.
Sometimes, issuers approve cardholders even without an application, basing
the approval on publicly available credit information. The issuer does not
actually extend credit until the cardholder presents the card to a third-party
merchant or bank to pay for goods, services, or a cash advance. The thirdparty merchant or bank, in turn, looks to the card issuer for payment.15
In adjudicating the debtor's intent to defraud, most courts have adopted
one of the following three theories: (1) the implied representation theory,
(2) the assumption of the risk theory, and (3) the totality of the circumstances
theory.' 6 Under the implied representation theory, when a debtor uses a
credit card, the debtor impliedly represents both the ability and the intention

10. The Court recognized the Second Restatement of Torts as "the most widely accepted
distillation of the common law of torts. .. published shortly before Congress passed the
[Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978]." Id. at 443-44.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS §§ 525-52 (1976); see also W. Page KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
12. See, e.g., Hecht's v. Valdes (In re Valdes), 188 B.R. 533, 535 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
13. See, e.g., AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360, 365 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1996).
14. Id.
15. See BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOsITS, COLLEcTIONS

CREDrr CARDS 15.02 (rev. ed. 1995), for a more detailed description of the standard
credit card transaction.
16. In Citibank v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1987 (9th Cir. 1996), the court
characterized implied representation as the majority theory and assumption of the risk as the
minority theory.
AND
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to repay the card issuer for the charges incurred."7 Under the assumption of
the risk theory, the court assumes that card issuers knowingly and willingly
assume the risk of default by cardholders. 8 Issuers demand and obtain
compensation for this assumed risk through interest rates. 9 Given that the
issuer bears a reasonable risk of default, the cardholder makes a false
representation regarding the intention to repay only if the cardholder uses the
card after the issuer has both revoked the card and clearly communicated the
fact of revocation to the cardholder. ° The only charges potentially nondischargeable on grounds of cardholder fraud, therefore, are those the cardholder
makes after revocation of the card. 2' Under the totality of the circumstances
theory, the court examines all of the facts and circumstances of a case. If the
court determines that the facts and circumstances, taken as a whole, indicate
deceptive conduct by the debtor, the court may infer that the debtor lacked the
requisite intent to repay.'
In Citibank v. Eashai (In re Eashai),1 a bankruptcy case decided just
two months prior to Anastas, the Ninth Circuit adopted the totality of the
circumstances theory. In ruling that Eashai committed fraud by utilizing a
kiting scheme :4 the court stated that it "may infer the existence of the
debtor's intent not to pay if the facts and circumstances of a particular case
present a picture of deceptive conduct by the debtor. "I The court applied a
twelve-factor objective test, that originated with the case of Citibank v.
Dougherty (In re Dougherty),26 and determined that under the circumstances,

17. See Bank of Va. v. Davis (In re Davis), 42 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
18. See First Nat'l Bank v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927, 932 (11th Cir. 1983).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. One can assume, however, that card use after revocation is becoming rare due to the
proliferation of electronic, point-of-sale card approval.
22. See Citibank v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Faulk (In re Faulk), 69 B.R. 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (establishing
totality of the circumstances as a new theory).
23. 87 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1996).
24. In Eashai, the debtor used 26 different credit cards to amass aggregate debt in excess of
$100,000.00. Id. at 1085.
In a typical kiting scheme, a debtor engages in a systematic process of using cash advances
from one or more cards to make the minimum monthly payments on others. As the credit lines
on existing cards are fully utilized, the debtor acquires additional cards, which he cash-advances
to make the minimum monthly payments on the previous cards. The debtor continues this process
until he is no longer able to acquire new cards with credit sufficient to accommodate his
aggregate minimum monthly obligations. At this point, "the game is over," and the debtor will
often suddenly cease payments on all cards and file for bankruptcy protection. See CLARK &
CLARK, supra note 15, 9.01, for a general background discussion on check kiting, which is
similar to credit card kiting.
25. Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1087.
26. See id. at 1087-88 (citing Citibank v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653 (B.A.P.
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Ea~hai intended to deceive the card issuer.27 In concluding that the Dougherty
twelve-factor test was necessary, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[s]ince a debtor
will rarely admit to his fraudulent intentions, the creditor must rely on the
twelve factors of Dougherty to establish the subjective intent of the debtor
through circumstantial evidence." 28 In essence, the Ninth Circuit used
objective criteria to determine the debtor's subjective intent to deceive as an
element of common law fraud.
The attitude of the Ninth Circuit seemingly changed two months later
when presented with Anastas v. American Savings Bank (In re Anastas). 29
The facts of Anastas are typical of most dischargeability cases. Bashir Anastas
held a Visa card, issued by American Savings Bank (ASB), with unpaid
charges totaling $6,624.00 at the time of bankruptcy. While Anastas
admittedly exceeded his authorized credit limit on the card, he never failed to
make his minimum monthly payments. Over a six-month period, he used the
cash advance feature of several credit cards, including the ASB account, to
finance his gambling activities. Ultimately, his debt on all cards totaled
$40,000.00.30
With monthly take home income of $3,465.00-ess than his monthly
expenses of $3,535.00-and with only $800.00 of liquid assets at the time of
bankruptcy, Anastas admitted to realizing that he no longer could meet the
minimum monthly payments on all of his cards. He testified that until the end
he intended to repay his creditors and that he unsuccessfully attempted to work
out alternative payment schedules with his creditors, including ASB. Rather
inevitably, he concluded that his only recourse was to file for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7.31
9th Cir. 1988)). The twelve factors are as follows:
1. The length of time between the charges made and the filing of bankruptcy;
2. Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing of
bankruptcy before the charges were made;
3. The number of charges made;
4. The amount of the charges;
5. The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges are made;
6. Whether the charges were above the credit limit of the account;
7. Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day;
8. Whether or not the debtor was employed;
9. The debtor's prospects for employment;
10. Financial sophistication of the debtor;
11. Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor's buying habits; and
12. Whether the purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.

Id.
27. Id. at 1091.
28. Id. at 1090.

29. 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996).
30. Id. at 1283.

31. Id.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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In an unpublished opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that Anastas's
debt to ASB was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) because Anastas had
committed fraud when he incurred the credit card charges. The bankruptcy
court based its finding of fraud on an objective evaluation of Anastas's ability
to repay his debt in light of his dire financial condition at the time he made the
charges. The debtor's inability to repay having been established, the
bankruptcy court further concluded that Anastas either lacked the intent to
repay the debt or was grossly reckless in incurring the debt.32
In Anastas, the Ninth Circuit modified the totality of the circumstances
test of intent that it had adopted two months earlier in Eashal.The Anastas
bankruptcy court had applied the twelve-factor Dougherty test and concluded
that Anastas had no intent to repay.33 In reversing the bankruptcy court and
the bankruptcy appellate panel on appeal, the Ninth Circuit did an odd thing.
It expressly affirmed the use of the Dougherty twelve-factor test as the test of
intent, but it criticized the bankruptcy court for applying the test to Anastas.34
The Ninth Circuit stated that the bankruptcy court had improperly focused it's
analysis on Anastas's financial condition. 3 The Ninth Circuit then attempted
to distinguish its analysis in Eashai by observing that Eashai was unusual
because it pertained to kiting activities." In contrast, Anastas pertained to
individual charges on a single credit card.3
The Ninth Circuit accepted as conclusive Anastas's testimony
that, although he had a gambling addiction and his financial condition was
desperate, he believed that he would win back the money necessary to repay
his debt and always had the intention to repay it.3" In an apparent retreat from the totality of the circumstances theory, the Ninth Circuit stated
that with respect to credit card debt, the representation that the debtor makes
to the issuer is not that he has the ability to repay but that he has the intent to
repay. 9 The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no evidence of Anastas's
intention not to repay his debt beyond his objectively measurable inability to
repay his debt. 4° Having supplanted the twelve-factor Dougherty test and its
emphasis on the debtor's ability to repay with a subjectively focused test, the
Ninth Circuit easily found that Anastas's debt to ASB was dischargeable. 4
Apparently, Anastas holds that, absent a case of credit card kiting, if the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 1284.
Id. (citing its recent decision in EashaO.
Id. at 1286-87.
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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debtor proffers testimony that he intended to repay the credit card charges
at the time he incurred them, he will not be found to have committed fraud,
and the debt will be dischargeable in bankruptcy. 2
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Anastas was not unprecedented. Over the
last several years, a pro-debtor movement focusing on the debtor's subjective
intent to repay in consumer credit card debt discharge cases has emerged.
Anastas lends significant credibility to this movement. Recently, in AT&T
Universal Card Services v. Feld (In re Feld),4 3 a bankruptcy court in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania professed to adopt the twelve-factor
Dougherty test but discounted the debtor's objective ability to pay as a
significant indicator of intent-a result that seems simultaneously to accept and
reject the twelve-factor test. The Feld court reasoned that it was "antithetical
to the [Bankruptcy Code's] fresh start policy" to use a debtor's ability to pay
against him; furthermore, the court found that such a use "confers an
advantage on credit card issuers unintended by Congress" because it makes a
debtor a guarantor of his own financial condition.4 The court noted that such
a use was at odds with the main reason that people use credit cards-they lack
the ability to pay at the time of use.45
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy),46 a bankruptcy
court in the Northern District of Illinois adopted a subjective test of the
debtor's intent as part of a totality of the circumstances approach. It rejected,
however, use of the twelve-factor Dougherty test as integral to the totality of
the circumstances examination.47 The court emphasized the importance of the
debtor's testimony of his own state of mind and permitted introduction of
evidence other than the debtor's ability to pay in support of his stated intention

42. Professor Walter Effross, an early commentator on the Ninth Circuit's holding inAnastas,
stated that "[a]s long as the debtor was standing at the betting window saying 'Next roll or next
race, I'm going to win it all back and be able to pay back the bank,' he's covered." Credit Card
Debts Are EasierTo Dischargeby Going Bankrupt, supra note 7, at 1.
43. 203 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
44. Id. at 368.
45. Id. In adopting a subjective test of a debtor's intent, the Feld court stated:
Ultimately, since all debtors choosing to litigate fraud complaints will likely
claim an intent to repay, the debtor's credibility will probably be the single most
important determinant of intent ....

The effect of employing a subjective standard

is that dischargeability will not turn on the reasonableness of the debtor's expectations
under the circumstances.

Id.
46. 190 B.R. 327 (Bankr. N.D. Il1.1995).
47. "Bankruptcy courts are especially good at reciting lists of factors. The courts then
compare the evidence to the list and count matches. mhe fact-finding process is only clouded
by copying a list of factors from other cases and weighing evidence according to how well it
matches that list." Id. at 333-34 (citations omitted).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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to repay.48 In concluding that Murphy's debts were dischargeable, the court

noted that there was no reason to doubt that Murphy honestly believed he
could gamble his way out of debt because he had successfully done so

previously.49 It did not matter whether his belief was reasonable under the
circumstances. The bankruptcy court concluded that using a "reasonable
person" (i.e., objective) test of subjective intent is incorrect under the common
law of fraud." The court elaborated on its Murphy analysis in AT&T

Universal CardServices v. Alvi (In re Alvi). 1t It stated that since the question
goes to the debtor's subjective intent to repay, the court cannot require that the
debtor have an "objectively reasonable basis for his belief."52
I. DISCHARGEABILITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE MARKETPLACE FOR
CONSUMER CREDIT
The courts, like Anastas, Murphy, and others, that have adopted a strict
subjective test of a consumer credit card debtor's intent have done one of two
things. At best, these courts have misinterpreted the language of § 525 of the
Second Restatement of Torts; at worst, they have imposed their own policy
goals to address perceived abuses in the marketplace for consumer credit by
favoring the consumer credit card debtor.
A. The Strict Subjective Test at the Extreme
The legal analysis supporting a strict subjective test of fraudulent intent
is unnecessarily extreme. InAmerican Express CenturionBank Optima v. Choi
48. Id. at 334.
49. Id.

50. Id. at 333. The court stated its logic as follows:
"The fhct that the misrepresentation is one that a man of ordinary care and
intelligence in the maker's situation would have recognized as false is not enough to
impose liability upon the maker for a fraudulent misrepresentation under the rule
stated in this Section, but it is evidence from which his lack of honest belief may be
inferred. So, too, it is a matter to be taken into account in determining the credibility
of the defendant if he testifies that he believed his representation to be true."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 526 cmt. d).
51. 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1996).
52. Id. at 733. The court added the following admonition:
"Care must be taken to stop short of a rule that would make every desperate,
financially strapped debtor a guarantor of his ability to repay, on pain of dischargeability. Such a rule would unduly expand the 'actual fraud' discharge exception by
attenuating the intent requirement. A substantial number of bankruptcy debtors incur
debts with hopes of repaying them that could be considered unrealistic in hindsight.
This by itself does not constitute fraudulent conduct warranting non-discharge."
Id. (quoting Karelin v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n (In re Karelin), 109 B.R. 943,
947-48 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990)).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/7
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(In re Choi)," a case that was decided after Anastas and Murphy, the
bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Virginia illuminated the flaws in the
legal analysis supporting a subjective test. The court noted that because the
credit card transaction is peculiar in nature, 4 it is difficult for the card issuer
to prove under § 523(a)(2)(A) that the cardholder did not intend to repay his
debt.5 5 Moreover, the cardholder invariably claims that he intended to repay.
Courts, therefore, must resolve the debtor's intent on the basis of other
evidence, as they do in other types of fraud cases.5 6 As the Choi court
pointed out, however, "What may set the credit card case apart is that in
many, if not most, instances, debtors probably do intend to pay the charges
they make." 57 The court commented further that this situation is the very
reason why most courts have traditionally analyzed a consumer credit card
debtor's intent under the Dougherty twelve-factor test or, as in its own case,
under a totality of the circumstances approach that does not use any predefined set of factors but looks at all of the circumstances objectively.58
The Choi court next examined the language of the Second Restatement of
Torts, 9 just as the court in Murphy had done. However, where the Murphy
court interpreted the Restatement's language to justify rejecting an objective
test of subjective intent, the Choi court concluded that the Restatement
provision fully supports use of an objective test when considered as part of a
totality of the circumstances analysis:
From the Restatement comment, it seems that whether the court accepts or
rejects the reasonable person test may be a question of semantics. Under
the rule as stated, the fact that a person of ordinary care and intelligence
(the reasonable person) would have recognized a representation as false
may be relied upon as evidence of fraud, and it also may bear on the
debtor's credibility as a witness.6
The Choi court acknowledged that the debtor's testimony is entitled to
as only one
substantial weight, but it insisted that such testimony be considered
6'
whole:
a
as
evidence
the
of
analysis
factor in the overall

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

203 B.R. 397 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Choi, 203 B.R. at 399.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 50.
Choi, 203 B.R. at 400.
Id.
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If a debtor's financial condition, viewed in its entirety at the time of a
credit card charge, presents a hopeless inability to pay, of which the debtor
was aware, this is evidence of fraudulent intent. And when these circumstances are present, I find it difficult to side with a debtor who subjectively
but irrationally intended to pay.6a
Without doubt, this statement in Choi is true; elevating the debtor's selfserving testimony of intent above all objective indicators of that intent is
unnecessarily pro-debtor.
Reliance on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Field v.
Mans,' a decision that dealt neither directly with the specific element of
intent nor with credit card debt discharge, to support applying a strict
subjective test of intent, is decidedly the wrong approach. Section 523(a)(2)(A), as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not require such an extreme
result. While the Supreme Court may have settled that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires
inquiry into a debtor's subjective state of mind,' the Court did not establish
exactly how that inquiry should proceed. The Supreme Court most certainly
did not state that a court must accept the debtor's own self-serving testimony-and little more-as evidence of the debtor's intent.A
The problem of establishing subjective intent based on indirect, objective
evidence is a familiar one. For example, in a trial for murder in the first
degree, the jury commonly looks to objective evidence to resolve whether or
not the accused's actions were premeditated. While the accused's own selfserving testimony is relevant, the jury will generally not take it to be
dispositive. Such testimony is but one of many factors that the jury weighs in
resolving questions of the accused's intent. A similar analysis applies in certain
types of tort actions where a plaintiff seeks punitive damages that are awarded
only when the defendant's behavior is willful. In those cases, the court
examines objective evidence to resolve the issue of willfulness. Again, rarely
will courts accept as dispositive the defendant's own testimony that his or her
actions were merely negligent.
As the Choi court noted, the Second Restatement of Torts does not
prohibit an objective test of subjective intent, like a reasonable man test. The
Restatement merely posits that application of a reasonable man standard,
without more, is not enough to support a finding of fraudulent intent. That is,
mere objective stupidity, incompetency, or poor judgement alone will not
support a finding of fraudulent intent. The Restatement otherwise clearly
embraces the reasonable man standard as having evidentiary value for use in

62. Id.
63. 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995).
64. See id. at 443.
65. As previously discussed, neither does the Restatement.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/7
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inferring fraudulent intent and in determining the credibility of the defendant.'
The Choi court, which favored an objective approach, acknowledged
that a financially distressed debtor often can successfully argue for discharge
by "demonstrating with at least some rational justification a belief that a
charge would be paid."67 In context, it seems clear that the court meant that
an objective test of a debtor's subjective intent can be overcome by other
evidence, including the debtor's own testimony. Exclusive reliance on a
debtor's testimony, however, is grossly unfair to creditors, who would rarely,
if ever, be able to prove the debtor's fraudulent intent. It cannot be overstressed that a debtor's declaration of the intent to repay should not alone
supplant a contrary finding of intent derived through a thorough analysis of
objective, indirect evidence.
The Choi court's analysis strikes an appropriate policy balance between
the competing interests of the debtor and creditor, and it does so within the
United States Supreme Court's requirement of using a subjective standard for
establishing the debtor's intent. The Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District
of Virginia, however, is but one court among hundreds, and Choi stands in
direct conflict with the influential Ninth Circuit's decision in Anastas.
Certainly the Anastas decision will make it easier for bankruptcy courts across
the country to either adopt a strict subjective test or at least weaken the
significance of more objective evidence, particularly as to the debtor's
reasonable ability to pay. As previously noted, a growing number of courts are
doing just that.
B. The Strict Subjective Test: PoliticalFashion?
Given that § 523(a)(2)(A) does not require a strict subjective test of
fraudulent intent, a question arises: Why are some courts apparently looking
for a reason not only to move away from using objective evidence to
determine the debtor's subjective intent but also to move toward relying more
on the debtor's own testimony as dispositive?
The answer to the question can possibly be found within the consumer
credit industry itself. The consumer credit industry in general, and the credit
card sector in particular, have undergone significant changes over the past few
years. Consumers have been accumulating more debt and filing for bankruptcy
in greater numbers. There were approximately 1.1 million bankruptcies in the

66. See supra note 50.
67. Choi, 203 B.R. at 399.
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United States during 1996-a new record. 6 This means that one out of every
one hundred families filed for bankruptcy protection in 1996.69
There are competing theories that attempt to explain the phenomenal rise
in bankruptcy filings during a period of relative economic prosperity. Financial
institutions claim that consumers irresponsibly use credit, that the federal
bankruptcy laws allow debtors to escape their debts too easily, and that
societal changes have partially removed the social stigma once associated with
personal bankruptcy.7" On the other hand, consumer groups and debtors'
attorneys blame job loss, uninsured medical bills, divorce (especially for
women), and guerilla marketing tactics by a "greedy" lending industry.7
The credit card industry has undoubtedly changed the way it does
business, especially with respect to the manner in which it markets cards to
consumers. Virtually all consumers have experienced a steady barrage of
unsolicited, pre-approved credit card offers. During 1995 and 1996, card
issuers distributed five billion solicitations, even though there are only 78
million credit-worthy households in the United States.' The 2.7 billion preapproved solicitations mailed during 1996 alone amount to roughly seventeen
offers for every person in the U.S. between the ages of 18 and 64, and the
average aggregate amount of credit extended to each household receiving those
7 Aggregate
seventeen offers was about $130,000.00P.
outstanding credit card
debt was $223 billion as of September 30, 1996, up from $204 billion in 1995
and $172 billion in 1994.14 In addition, card issuers raised the aggregate
credit limit on outstanding cards to $1.28 trillion as of September 30, 1996,
up from $815 billion in 1994.1s As of June 30, 1996, there were 376 million
Visas and Mastercards in circulation in the United States, up from 209 million

68. NAT'LBANKR. REV. COMM'N, QuarterlySummary and ProgressReport,December,1996,
<http://www.nbre.gov/archive/qrpt12.96.html >.
69. Id.
70. See Robert K. Heady, Credit-CardCompanies Want 'Lenient'BankruptcyLaws Revised,
SUN-SENT. (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 6, 1997, (Your Business), at 25; Ken Skopec, Editorial,
House of Cards:FinancialService IndustryDeserves Partof the Blame On Why More andMore
People Are Headedfor the Poorhouse,CHI. TRiB., Dec. 26, 1996, (Commentary), at 29.
71. Donna Halvorsen & Dee DePass, The Bankruptcy Business; Lawyers Argue Over Who's
Responsible, STAR TRm., Jan. 24, 1997, at 19A.
72. Skopec, supra note 70, at 29.
73. Laurie Hays, Banks' Marketing Blitz Yields Rash of Defaults, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25,
1996, at B1.
74. Dee DePass & Donna Halvorsen, The Bankruptcy Business; Who Is to Blamefor Rise in
PersonalBankruptcy?, STAR TRw., Jan. 24, 1997, at 1A.
75. Id.
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in 1991.76 On June 30, 1996, the average credit card holder possessed from
eight to ten cards, with combined outstanding debt of $3,900.00.7
In summary, record numbers of U.S. consumers are in serious financial
difficulty. Many believe that consumer debtors are in distress because these
debtors have failed to exercise common sense and self-restraint. Others,
however, contend that the credit card issuers "make them do it" by utilizing
exploitive credit card marketing tactics which force credit upon consumers
who lack the sophistication to manage it. Some commentators urge that,
through overzealous marketing, "'[card issuers] have created their own
monster.'"78 Evidence suggests that a growing number of courts may agree.
It is quite possible that some courts, while not expressly admitting this, are in
certain cases adopting a debtor-friendly, "more subjective/less objective" test
of the debtor's subjective intent to repay as a means of sanctioning credit card
issuers. A reading of the dicta in recent bankruptcy opinions suggests that a
growing number of courts disapprove of the marketing tactics being utilized
by some credit card lenders.7 9 One Texas bankruptcy court recently went so
far as to brand the credit card industry's solicitation practices as "commercial
entrapment. "1
76. Jerome R. Stockfisch, Millions ofAmericans Are Deluged with Credit CardOffers Daily.
Low InterestRates. No Annual Fees. But What Sounds Like a Deal May Sink You Only Deeper
into Debt. Here's Where To Turn If You Find YourselfDoing the... Credit Card Crush, TAMPA
TRi., Jan. 27, 1997, (Business & Finance), at 16.
77. Id.

78. Halvorsen& DePass, supranote 71, at 19A (quoting New Brighton lawyer Jack Prescott).
79. See, e.g., Citibank v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring) ("[it would be wrong to conclude that a person who genuinely
becomes overextended, perhaps because of the availability of too much free and easy credit, risks
nondischargeability. In short, the credit card issuer is not entirely blameless in this equation.");
Chevy Chase, F.S.B. v. Hoffman (In re Hoffman), 934 F.2d 319, 1991 WL 91445, at **1 (4th
Cir. June 4, 1991) (unpublished table decision) ("We are persuaded that conduct resulting from
susceptibility to the kind of market place enticements .demonstratedby this case is not the type
of conduct contemplated by § 523."); AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203
B.R. 360, 370 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Unsolicited credit cards are received in the average
American household with the same frequency as discount shopping coupons. Presumably these
lenders have calculated the increased risk that this practice entails and have factored it into the
pricing of their product through finance and other charges."); AT&T Universal Card Servs. v.
Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1996) ("Creditors 'mightjust as well pass
out cards to every working person it [sic] can find and hope those who use them will pay for the
charges.'") (quoting Chevy Chase, F.S.B. v. Pressgrove (In re Pressgrove), 147 B.R. 244, 247
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1992)); Hecht's v. Valdes (In re Valdes), 188 B.R. 533, 539 (Bankr. D. Md.
1995) ("Plaintiff voluntarily entered into this financial relationship with Mr. Valdes at a point in
time when he already had incurred significant unsecured credit card debt."); Citibank v. Davis
(In re Davis), 176 B.R. 118, 120 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994) ("mhe credit card industry has
deluged virtually every adult American with invitations to become a charge customer. ...
Lending practices almost encourage the misuse of credit, such as to finance existing debt
service.").
The bank sent a financially strapped Debtor an enticement to consolidate
80.
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Perhaps some courts are using their judicial power to reshape the nature
of the debtor-creditor relationship with respect to credit card transactions;
perhaps they are not. One fact, however, is certain: in a market economy, an
industry will ultimately recover its costs of doing business from its customers.
Although empirical evidence is unavailable, it is reasonable to assume that if
industry-hostile judges fashion rules that make it easy for credit card debtors
to avoid their debts through bankruptcy proceedings and if, as a result, the
amount of credit card debt discharged in bankruptcy proceedings continues to
rise, credit card issuers will pass the cost of this discharged debt on to
cardholders in the form of higher interest rates.
Credit card issuers conduct billions of transactions with millions of
consumer cardholders across the United States and around the world. In 1995,
banks earned $35 billion in interest on credit card transactions. 8' Surely, an
industry with such a pervasive financial impact on society requires some
amount of governmental regulation. It should not need mention, however, that
courts are not the appropriate regulatory bodies. Policy decisions touching
nearly all U.S. citizens are the rightful province of the legislative branch.
Perhaps partially in recognition of this fact, Congress appointed the ninemember National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. The task of the NBRC is to reexamine the
Bankruptcy Code, solicit input from interested parties, evaluate proposals for
reforms, and report back to Congress, the President, and the Chief Justice by
October 20, 1997 with recommendations for revisions to the Bankruptcy
Code.' One of the NBRC's principal recommendations should be
that Congress codify an objective test under § 523(a)(2)(A) for determining a
credit card debtor's fraudulent intent for dischargeability purposes. The NBRC
should use the twelve-factor test of Dougherty83 as a starting point because,
as discussed previously, many courts have successfully utilized this test for
twenty years. Although Congress might rightly choose to modify the twelvefactor test to eliminate some factors and add others, the end product should be

bills and to purchase holiday gifts, bolstered by emphasis on a low interest
rate and an increased credit limit. The Bank cannot now be heard to
complain that the Debtor committed fraud by doing the very thing the Bank
touted-getting cash advances to pay other bills. To allow the Bank to
prevail in this situation would result in converting dischargeable debts into
nondischargeable debts and would amount to this court condoning commercial entrapment.
Bank One Columbus, N.A. v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel), 202 B.R. 74,79 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1996).
81. Hays, supranote 73, at B1.
82. Nat'l Bankr. Rev. Comm'n, NBRCFactSheet (last modified Feb. 1997) <http://www.nbr8.gov/fants.htm >. e
83. See supra note 26 for a list of the factors.
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an objective test of intent that is straightforward and subject to reasonably
uniform application.
Although common law purists and judges who prefer not to shed judicial
discretion will likely disapprove of this proposal, it is, nevertheless, a
necessary reform. As previously noted, Congress-not the judiciary-is better
suited to make policy decisions that impact nearly all Americans. Also, the
Bankruptcy Code is federal law. As such, its application should be relatively
uniform across the fifty states and territories-not subject to substantial
jurisdictional differences. There is today absolutely no uniformity in
adjudicating credit card debt dischargeability across the federal court system.
Credit card issuers-which conduct their business worldwide-and today's
transient consumers will be best served by a statute that forces federal courts
to adjudicate credit card matters in bankruptcy with some level of predictable
consistency, regardless of jurisdiction, and with a fair and reasonably uniform
balance between debtors' and creditors' rights.
Samuel B. Cothran, Jr.
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